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in the Light of Rational 
Expectations 
Olivier Jean Blanchard 
This paper uses a structural empirical model to examine the effects of 
anticipated and unanticipated monetary policy under the assumption of 
rational expectations. In particular, it characterizes the effects of  such a 
policy on output, the short-term real interest rate, and the stock market. 
Existing  macroeconometric models provide  us with  a description of 
the  transmission  mechanism,  but  they  assume  implicitly  that  the way 
agents form their expectations is invariant to policy and, as emphasized 
by  Lucas  (1976), this casts serious  doubts on the usefulness  of  their 
answer. Furthermore, because they do not explicitly specify the role of 
expectations, their  defects  cannot be  easily remedied;  in  effect a  new 
model has to be set up and estimated. 
The model  used  here extends  the  analytical model presented  in  an 
earlier paper  (Blanchard 1978). It consists of  two parts, aggregate de- 
mand  and  aggregate  supply.  The model  of  aggregate  demand  treats 
expectations explicitly  and  thus  its  structure should be approximately 
invariant to changes in policy. It has been estimated by Blanchard and 
Wyplosz  (1978). The model of  aggregate supply is not  estimated but 
postulated; this reflects my belief that there may not be enough informa- 
tion  in past data to obtain the exact specification of  aggregate supply; 
the model has characteristics that  are both  desirable theoretically  and 
in accordance with recent empirical evidence  (Barro 19786 in particu- 
lar). 
The complete model is used to look at a very simple policy, namely, 
a decrease in the nominal money stock, starting from steady state. The 
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paper is organized as follows: Section 1 presents the model of aggregate 
demand.  Section 2 describes the model  of  aggregate supply. Section  3 
characterizes the steady state and the dynamic behavior of  the complete 
model.  Section 4  characterizes  the effects of  anticipated  and unantici- 
pated monetary policy with exogenous prices. The purpose of  this sec- 
tion  is to give a better understanding of  the behavior of  aggregate de- 
mand, independent of  the particular formalization  of  aggregate supply. 
Section 5 presents the effects of  the same policy with endogenous prices. 
1.  Aggregate Demand 
Aggregate demand is  defined as the value of  output that equilibrates 
goods and assets markets given past, current, and anticipated  values of 
the price 1evel.l The structure follows the model of  Metzler (1951) and 
emphasizes the interaction between wealth, spending, and output. 
In the  goods  market,  wealth  determines  private  spending;  private 
and public spending determine output. Human wealth and stock market 
wealth in turn are the present discounted values of  anticipated labor and 
capital income; they  therefore  depend  on the sequence  of  anticipated 
output. 
The model is a quarterly model. Stock and flow variables are in inten- 
sive form, divided by physical capital K2  They will therefore be constant 
if the corresponding levels grow at the same rate as capital.  (They are 
denoted  by  lower-case letters; corresponding upper-case  letters will be 
used to denote their levels when convenient). 











the expectation of z~+~,  held at time t 
the real value of  a share which is the title to a unit of  physical 
the real  (shadow) value of  a unit of  labor (in efficiency units) 
the logarithm of  the price level 
the short-term nominal and (ex ante) real rates 
the logarithm of  the nominal money stock 
the real value of  government bonds 




1.  This  section summarizes Blanchard  and  Wyplosz  1978,  to which  the  reader 
is  referred  for more  detail  about  definitions of  variables,  specification,  and  esti- 
mation of  the equations. 
2.  Note  that  the  variables  are divided  by K,  not by  L, as is usual  in  growth 
models. 77  The Monetary Mechanism in the Light of Rational Expectations 
?F  profit 
L 
c, in  consumption and investment 
X 
the total labor force (in efficiency units) 
the sum of  inventory investment, net exports, and government 
The model was estimated with data from the period  1953:I to 1976:TV. 
Means  and standard  deviations  of  these  variables  for that period  are 
given in table 3.1. 
Each  equation  was  estimated by  two-stage  least  squares  with  first- 
order serial correlation correction. The instruments used for estimation 
were first tested for statistical exogeneity. Lag structures  were left un- 
constrained.  Each  equation  was  tested  for  partial  adjustment  versus 
serial correlation  and  for  subsample  stability.  The reported  estimated 
coefficients are individually significant at the 90%  confidence leveL3 
spending 
The equations are as follows: 
Goods market 
(1)  ~t =  .389 ht +  (.028  ~t  +  .041 ~t-1) 
+  (.250ydt +  .117 ydt-1) 
(2)  Wt  qt +  bt 
(3) 
(4) 
ydt =  .461 +  .33 Yt 
int =  -.093  + (.003  qt +  .025 qt-1 
+  .019 qt-2 +  .021 qt-3) 
+  (.144  Yt +  .044 yt-1) 
Yt =  Ct +  int +  Xt => 
Yt =  .097 +  .lo7 yt-1 +  1.29 ~t +  .502 ht 
+  .040 qt +  .085 qt-1 
+  .025 4t-2  +  .027 qt--3 
+  .036 bt +  .053  bt-1 
Asset  markets 
(6) 
(7) 
rnt -  pt =  (-543 -  .193 In Kt) +  .590 (mt-l -  ~t-~) 
+  .179 yt -  1.001 it 
rt =  it -  4 (tPt+l -  Pt) 
3. Two coefficients are not individually significant at the 90% confidence level: 
current  wealth  (wt)  in  the  consumption equation  with  a  t-statistic of  1.46 and 
current q in the  investment equation with  a t-statistic of  .23. 78  Olivier Jean Blanchard 
Table 3.1  Sample Means and Standard Deviations, 19539  to 1976:IV 
Mean  Standard Deviation  1976:IV Value 
~  ~~~~ 
4  323 
h  1  .a 
i  3.99% 
r  .91%b 
b  .776 
0  1.589 
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NOTES 
choice of  units for labor. 
real rate defined as the nominal rate minus actual inflation. 
a. This variable  is  unobservable.  Its  mean  is  normalized  to be unity,  by  the 
h.  This variable, the ex ante real rate, is unobservable. This is the mean ex post 
(11)  ydt  .461 +  .33 Yt 
Equations ( 1  )-( 3) characterize consumption as a function of  wealth 
-human  and nonhuman-and  income. Given that wealth  is  included, 
disposable income is  not a  proxy  for wealth but indicates the effect of 
liquidity  constraints on current consumption. Nonhuman wealth is  de- 
fined  as the sum of  stock market wealth  and government bonds. This 
definition does not, however,  imply that the level of  government bonds 
affects consumption: anticipated tax liabilities needed to pay interest on 
the debt will  decrease either q  or h  (or both), possibly  offsetting the 
effect of  b  (see Barro 1978~).  Real money balances are excluded from 
wealth:  outside money is  very  small compared with  the other compo- 
nent~.~  (Equation  (1) presents  an  estimation problem  because h, the 
4.  As  noted  in  Sargent  1976, the  presence  of  outside  money  in  wealth-the 
direct  Pigou  effect-leads  to nonneutrality  of  anticipated  monetary  policy.  Re- 
moving it  from wealth  removes therefore this nonneutrality,  which  is empirically 
unimportant.  (Fischer reaches  a similar  conclusion; see chap. 7.) 79  The Monetary Mechanism in the Light of  Rational Expectations 
present  discounted  value  of  expected  labor  income,  is  unobservable. 
Thus, in order to estimate  (1  ), an assumption must be made about how 
agents  formed  their  expectations  of  future  labor  income  during  the 
sample  period.  Estimation  was  done  assuming  static  expectations  for 
h.5 If  h was in fact correlated with w and yd, as is likely, the estimated 
coefficients on w and yd are likely to be biased upwards). 
Equation  (4) characterizes  fixed investment. It depends on the valu- 
ation of  capital, q. Empirically, investment depends significantly on out- 
put which is thus included, although theoretical  reasons for its presence 
are not clear. 
Equation  (5)  characterizes goods market equilibrium and is obtained 
by  replacing  equations  (1  )-(4)  in  the  equilibrium  equation.  Compo- 
nents of  spending other than consumption  and fixed investment are un- 
explained  at  this  stage  and  will  therefore  be  taken  as  exogenous  in 
simulations.  Equation  (5) gives  output as  a  function  of  the different 
components of  wealth  and exogenous spending. The direct effect of the 
past  on current  yt is small:  the coefficient on yt-l is  .107. The direct 
short-run multiplier is  1.29: it does not, however, indicate the complete 
effect of  exogenous spending because movements in xt will usually affect 
the values of  the different components of  wealth. The long-run  elastici- 
ties of  y with respect to q and h are of  12% and 41 % approximately. 
In the assets  markets, tradable  nonmoney  assets such  as bonds and 
shares  are assumed  perfect  substitutes.  Equilibrium  is  thus  character- 
ized  by  equilibrium  in  the  money  market  and  the  arbitrage  equations 
between  nonmoney  assets. 
Equation  (6) characterizes  equilibrium  in  the  money  market.  This 
determines  the nominal  short-term  interest  rate,  given  The implied 
elasticities  of  money  demand  using  1976:IV values for y  and  i are .23 
and  .061, respectively,  in the short run,  .56 and .148 in the long run. 
Kt  enters equation  (6) because, with the less than unitary elasticity with 
respect to income, the demand for money is not homogenous in K. 
Equation  (7) defines the ex ante real rate of  interest.  The presence 
of  4 comes  from the  measurement  of  interest  at annual rates,  whereas 
the time unit of  the model is the quarter. (tpt+l -  pt) is the logarithmic 
approximation  to the expected rate of  inflation. 
5. Estimation under  the  assumption of  rational  expectations is  intended. 
6. The estimated demand  for money  depends  on two  interest  rates,  the  three- 
month  Treasury  bill  rate  and  the  time  deposit  rate,  j. The  equation  used  here 
assumes that the time deposit rate follows: 
j=  .5  (.033) +  .5  (i) 
.033 is the sample mean of  j. 
Because  of  the  presence  of  interest  rate  ceilings,  the  behavior of  j  is  more the 
result  of  the  Fed  policy than  unconstrained profit  maximization  by  banks.  Thus 
the  above relation may be  interpreted as a policy rule of  the  Fed. 80  Olivier Jean Blanchard 
Equation  (8) is derived from the arbitrage condition between shares 
and  short-term  bonds.  The expected  return  on shares-which  is  the 
sum of  two components, profit income and capital gain (or loss)-must 
be  equal  to  the  expected  return  on  short-term  bonds  plus  a  fixed 
premium  p. 
The arbitrage  condition  equivalently  follows  from  the  statement  that 
qt is the present  discounted value of  expected profit: 
4t= i  mt+(  6  (I+  trt+i +  ”>’), 
7=O  i=O 
The only coefficient to be  estimated in  equation  (8’)  is  the premium; 
it  is  estimated  by  the  difference  between  the  sample  mean  return  on 
shares  and  short-term  treasury  bills,  which  is  approximately  equal  to 
7.5%. Equation  (8) is  obtained by replacing p by  its numerical value, 
making a minor adjustment for consistency of  the q and T  series, multi- 
plying the T  series by  1.04, and rearranging the above arbitrage equa- 
tion  (8’). Equation  (9) gives profit income as a function of  output. 
Human wealth is  the present discounted value of  labor income but is 
not tradable; it is  assumed that the relevant discount rate is the same as 
for stock market wealth, so that the value of  a unit of  labor is given by: 
where  YL,  denotes labor  income and rt  denotes  the total  number of 
(efficiency)  units of  labor  at time  t. In the simulation,  agents will  be 
assumed to have rational  expectations. If  agents have rational  expecta- 
tions, equation  (10’)  implies that h, follows an  “arbitrage-like’’ equa- 
tion : 
The first term is  labor income per unit of  labor, divided by  the shadow 
value of  a unit of  labor. The presence of  (E)t is due to the fact that 
ylt  is  labor  income  divided  by  physical  capital:  it  must  therefore  be 
multiplied by capital and divided by labor to give labor income per unit 
of labor. The second term is the expected  “capital gain” or loss. 
7. This is  derived  as  follows:  Lead  (10‘)  once  and  take  conditional expecta- 
tions  as  of  time  t  on  both  sides.  Multiply  both  sides  by  (1  -+-  (,rt+p)/4)-’ 
and  subtract  from  (10’). 81  The Monetary Mechanism in the Light of Rational Expectations 
The simulations  will  assume physical capital and the labor force to 
be  growing at  the same constant rate,  so that  will  be constant 
and equal to ($).  The value of  (t)  depends on the choice of  units 
for labor. They  are chosen such that the value of  one unit of  labor is 
K 
unity  in  steady  state;  this  determines -  = .093.  Equation  (10)  is  L 
obtained by rearranging the above “arbitrage like” equation. Disposable 
income, ydt is used rather  than labor  income ylt, because of  the poor 
quality  of  data on yl,. Equation  (1  1) gives the relation  of  disposable 
income to output. 
Therefore  in  the  assets  markets,  output  and  nominal  money  deter- 
mine  the  short-term  nominal  rate,  given prices.  Given the anticipated 
rate  of  inflation,  this  determines the  short-term  real  rate.  Arbitrage 
equations  determine  the  value  of  qt  and  ht  given  the  anticipations 
Because the effect  of  expectations  on  spending  is  treated  explicitly 
in  this  model,  through  the  presence  of  the  different  components  of 
wealth, the coefficients of this model should be approximately invariant 
to policy:  they should, abstracting from aggregation problems,  depend 
mainly  on coefficients reflecting institutional  arrangements, tastes,  and 
technology. Thus the model of  aggregate demand, together with a model 




2.  Aggregate Supply 
Most  economists  agree  that  the behavior  of  the price level is  such 
that,  at least  as  a  first  approximation,  nominal  disturbances  have  no 
long-run  effect  on  output.  There  is  also  a  wide  agreement  that  the 
short-run real effects of  such disturbances, if  any, coincide with devia- 
tions  of  the  price  level  from  its  anticipated  value,  however  defined. 
There is, however, little knowledge of  the precise relation between price 
level deviations  and output.  There is little hope of  obtaining a precise 
specification from  empirical evidence:  it  is, for example, very hard to 
determine the  separate  effects of  the predictions  of  today’s  price level 
made one year and two years ago.  (This point is made empirically by 
Fischer chap. 7.) Thus, an aggregate supply equation can only be esti- 
mated by  imposing strong specification restrictions, with little guidance 
by  the theory.  (An interesting attempt is made by Taylor 1978.) 
The model  of  price  level behavior  used  here  is therefore  not  esti- 
mated  but  postulated;  its  characteristics  and  implications  are  in  ac- 
cordance with the available empirical evidence. Its structure is extremely 82  Olivier Jean Blanchard 
simple:  the  price  level  adjusts  toward  the  price  that  would  equate 
aggregate supply and aggregate demand. When it differs from this price, 
production is determined by  aggregate demand.8 
1. If  markets  were  auction  markets  and there  was perfect informa- 
tion  about  the  current  state  of  the  world,  then,  as  shown  by  many 
authors  (Sargent and Wallace  1975, for example),  changes in  money, 
both  current  or  anticipated,  would  have  no  effect  on  real  variablesg 
such as output, the real interest rate, and the values of  one unit of physi- 
cal or human  capital. The goods market equilibrium equation  (5) and 
the  arbitrage  equations  (8) and  (10)  would  always be satisfied with 
y, r, q,  h equal to their steady state values denoted y, r, q, h, respectively. 
The price level would therefore be such as to maintain portfolio balance. 
Define for simplicity 
(12) 
Denote the price level in this case by p*. It would follow, from equa- 
tions  (6)  and (7)  : 
---- 
a(t)  E  .135 -  .048 In Kt +  .045 y-  1.001 F. 
(13)  (t~*t+l  -  P*A =  dt)  -  250 (m-  P*~) 
+  .147 (mt-1-  p”t-1). 
This equation states that the expected rate of  inflation must be such 
that  agents  are satisfied with  their  real  money  balances.  It is,  except 
for the presence of lagged money, similar to the equilibrium condition 
of  the model of  Cagan  (1956). The behavior  of  the price level satisfy- 
ing this condition and rational expectations has been studied by Sargent 
and Wallace  (1973). It is  useful to  characterize this  behavior  in  two 
cases,  the  case of  an unanticipated  change  and the  case  of  an antici- 
pated  change in nominal money. 
“Unanticipated”  and “anticipated” must first be defined. A change is 
unanticipated  if  the  announcement  and  implementation  of  the  change 
are  simultaneous.  It is  anticipated  if  the  announcement  precedes  the 
implementation.  In  both  cases,  the  change  is  assumed  to be  known 
when it is implemented. 
If  a change in nominal money is  unanticipated,  and if  it is  assumed 
to be permanent,  the price level will  change at the time of  the imple- 
mentation and in the same proportion as nominal money. If  it is antici- 
pated, the price level will  start to change at the time of  the announce- 
ment: if  it did not change until the implementation, agents would expect 
8.  Aggregate  demand  is  assumed  to  determine  sales.  Because  inventory  be- 
havior  is  unexplained  at this  stage,  it  also  determines  production.  Relaxing  the 
equality between  production  and  sales would  clearly  be  desirable. 
9. This  statement  disregards  various  sources  of  noneutrality  (Tobin,  Pigou 
effects),  which  are not  present  in the model of  aggregate demand. 83  The Monetary Mechanism in the Light of  Rational Expectations 
a large  capital gain  or loss on  real  money balances.  The equilibrium 
path of  the price level between the announcement and implementation 
must be such that  agents are satisfied with  their  real  money  balances 
given  the  expected  rate  of  change  of  the  price  level.  The important 
implication, for our purposes, is that the price level will change before 
the actual change in nominal money if  the change is  anticipated. 
2.  The actual price level, pt, will  be  assumed to adjust partially to- 
ward the “desired”  level p*t in the following way: 
(14)  Pt =  yp*t +  (1 -  y)  Pt-1, 
y  E [0,11, 
where p*t is given by  (13). 
Prices  would  be perfectly  flexible and  nominal  disturbances  would 
have no real effect if  y = 1; they would  be fixed for y =  0. What are 
the characteristics of  price level behavior if  y  is between 0 and l?  Con- 
sider again a permanent change in nominal money. 
If  it is unanticipated,  p*  adjusts immediately to its new equilibrium 
value  and p  adjusts gradually over time.  After  n periods,  the propor- 
tional difference between them is (1 -  7)”.  Over time p converges to p*, 
and there is no long-run effect of  the change of money. 
If  the  change was  anticipated,  both  p*  and  p  change  after the an- 
nouncement.  The longer  the  period  between  the  announcement  and 
the  implementation,  the  smaller the initial  change in  p*, the closer p 
will  be to p*  and  the  smaller the  real  effects of  a  change in money. 
(This will be shown later.) Thus the longer a change in nominal money 
has been anticipated, the less real effect it has. If  it has been anticipated 
“forever,” it will have no real effect at all. 
The only parameter to be chosen is y. Recent empirical evidence by 
Barro shows that unanticipated nominal disturbanceslO affect prices over 
a period of  four years. This suggests a value of  y between .1 and .2 ap- 
proximately.ll  When  y =  .2,  the  increase  in  the  real  money  stock  is 
.16 of  the initial nominal increase after two years, .02 after four years. 
When  7 =  .l, these numbers  are  .43 and .18. The value  of  .2 will be 
used for most simulations in section 5. 
Although  equation  (14) has desirable properties, it must be slightly 
changed if  the nominal money stock is growing, so that p* is also grow- 
ing, say at rate A.  In this case if  p  followed  (14),  it would never equal 
p*. The natural extension is then: 
10.  What  Barro  calls  “unanticipated”  would  in  this  paper  be  called  “antici- 
pated  for less than one year.” 
11. Another  finding  of  Barro  is  that  the  effect  of  unanticipated  money  on 
prices  has  a  hump-shaped  lag  structure.  This  cannot  be  captured  adequately  by 
the simple partial adjustment  postulated  in  (14). 84  Oilvier Jean Blanchard 
(15) 
This formalization implies that changes in the nominal money stock 
from trend, that is, temporary changes in the rate of  growth of  money, 
will have no effect in the long run,  or no effect at all if  fully anticipated. 
Because  the  policies  considered  in  the  following  sections  will  be 
temporary changes in the rate of  growth of  money, aggregate supply will 
be characterized by  (1  3) and  (1  5). 
Pt =  YP*t + (1 -  Y)  (&-I+  A). 
3.  Steady State and Dynamics 
The system  is  described  by  equations  (1) to  (1  1) and  (13) and 
(15). I  first characterize its steady  state, then  study its stability under 
the assumption of  rational expectations; finally the exact policy experi- 
ment considered in the following sections is described. 
The Steady State 
The absence of  an estimated supply equation does not allow one to 
determine from the model the steady state values for output and the real 
interest  rate.  If  the  system  was  approximately  in  steady  state during 
the sample period, the sample values for the ratio of  output to physical 
capital and the real  (ex post) interest rate should be close to the steady 
state values. Values of  1.377 for Y,  and of  1  % for rare  chosen as steady 
state values.  This  implies  values  of  347 for  the real  value  of-a  unit 
of  physical capital 4,  1.003 for the real value of  a unit of  labor h, from 
the arbitrage equations.12 
Values of  .361 and .776 are chosen for nand F,  respectively.  (It is 
clear that a constant value for b implies that government debt is grow- 
ing at the same rate as capital; this was not true of  the sample period.) 
The demand  for money  is  not  homogenous  in  capital. Thus a con- 
stant ratio  of  real  money  to physical  capital  would  lead to an  excess 
supply of real  money given the interest rate; equivalently, the ratio of 
real  money  to  physical  capital  must  decrease  to  maintain  the  same 
interest rate. If  a steady state is  a state in  which the ratios of  all real 
flows  and  stocks  to physical  capital  are  constant,  this  system has  no 
steady state. For simplicity, this effect is removed by assuming In  Kt to 
be  constant  in the  demand for money  equation; this  implies  that  the 
elasticity  of  the  demand  for  money  is  less  than  one  with  respect  to 
deviations of  output  from steady state and one with  respect to steady 
state increase. The value of  In Kt  will be taken to be 6.911, its 1976:IV 
value. In this case, the rate of  inflation  is  equal in  steady state to the 
12. This is  close  to the  mean  sample  value of  q, which is  ,823. The fact  that 
this sample value is less  than one is  a  well-known  puzzle.  (The time series for q 
is  taken  from yon Furstenberg  1977.) 85  The Monetary Mechanism in the Light of Rational Expectations 
-  -  r  - 
Zt+l  Zt 
ZL+l  zlt 
qlt 
42t+l  -  A  q2t 
43t+i  (7 x 7)  q3t 
tht+i  ht 
+  net,  -  41t+l 
....  .... 
t4t +  1  4t 
b  -  - 
rate of  growth  of  money minus the rate of  growth of  output. This rate 
of inflation will be assumed to be equal to 4% at an annual rate. This 
implies  a  real  money  stock  of  1.404 for  equilibrium  in  the  money 
market. 
The Dynamics 
The main  conclusion here  is  that the  system,  linearized  around its 
steady state, is stable under rational expectations with either exogenous 
or endogenous prices.  “Stability” means that if  the exogenous variables 
follow  linear  stationary  processes,  the endogenous  variables  will  also 
follow linear stationary processes. 
Consider  first  the  case  where  prices  are  assumed  to be  exogenous 
and growing at the steady state rate of  inflation. The system is then the 
aggregate  demand  system,  composed  of  equations  (1)-( 11).  This 
system  is  nonlinear  in  its  two  arbitrage  equations  and  must  first  be 
linearized  around the steady state values  of  q, h, and r in order to be 
solved for rational  expectations. It can then be reduced to a system of 
seven variables. Define 
-- 
zt t  yt-] ;  zl, =  ztP1  and 
qlt =  qt-1 ;  q2t =  qt-2 ;  q3t =  qt-3. 
&+I,  t4t+l. 
A more precise statement is that the first five variables are predeter- 
mined at time t, whereas the last two, ht and qt,  are not. Beczuse of  the 
absence of  initial conditions for ht and qt, there is clearly an infinity of 
solutions to the system ( 16). 
It may, however,  be  argued that variables  such as ht and qt should 
not depend on the past, except through its effect on the currently pre- 
determined variables, namely, yt-l, ytP2,  qt-l, qtP2,  and qt-3. If such 86  Olivier Jean Blanchard 
an argument is accepted, a unique  solution satisfies this condition; this 
is  the solution usually chosen in models with rational expectations and 
is  referred to as the “forward” or “forward-looking’’ solution. 
The forward solution to systems such as  (16), together with its sta- 
bility condition have been derived in  another paper  (Blanchard 1980). 
The  stability  condition  is  that  the  matrix  A  must  be  such  that  the 
number  of  roots  inside  the  unit  circle  must  be  equal to  the number 
of predetermined variables, namely five in this case. The roots of  A are: 
-.170 
-.059  -  .178 i 
.196 +  .151 i 
.196 -  .151 i 
-.059  +  .178 i 
1.0212 
1.043  1 
Thus this system is stable with exogenous prices. 
The appendix  gives the  solution of  the  system,  that is, the current 
values  of  the  endogenous  variables  as  a function of  the past, current, 
and  anticipated  future  exogenous  variables.  The five  roots  inside  the 
unit circle determine heuristically the “weight” of  the past in determin- 
ing the current equilibrium  (this is made clear by equations A1 and A2 
in the  appendix) : their  small  absolute value indicates that the current 
equilibrium  does  not  depend  very  much  on the  past.  The inverse of 
the  roots  outside the  circle  determine  the  “weight”  of  the  anticipated 
future; the fact that their  value is close to unity indicates that the cur- 
rent equilibrium depends largely on these  anticipations. These heuristi- 
cal  statements  will  help  in  understanding  the  results  of  the  next  two 
sections. 
Consider now the full system of  aggregate demand and aggregate sup- 
ply. It can be reduced  to a system of  ten variables  including the vari- 
ables  above plus  P*~,  ~l*~  =P*~-~,  and ~l~=p,-~.  Both  pl*t and 
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The stability  condition  is that the system must have seven roots in- 
side the unit circle. This condition is satisfied. The system has the same 




Thus if  prices adjust rapidly, that is, if  y is large, all the roots inside the 
circle  are  again  small  and  the  past  is  relatively  unimportant.  If  y is 
small,  prices  adjust  slowly and the current  equilibrium depends more 
on the past, through prices. 
The stability of  the system is not just a happy accident. The property 
that the system has the same number of  roots inside the unit circle as 
predetermined  variables  is  called  the  “strict  saddle  point”  property. 
Growth  models  with  many  assets  have  been  shown  to  have  this 
property usually and the present model has a structure similar to these 
theoretical models. 
It  is  interesting  to  contrast  this  stability  result  with  the  instability 
of  the MPS  model  with  endogenous prices  (the dynamic properties  of 
this model have been  studied by  Corrado 1976). Except for the treat- 
ment of  expectations, this model and the MPS have a similar structure. 
The MPS  also  emphasizes  the  role  of  wealth  in  spending  decisions. 
Our  model,  however,  assumes  rational  expectations, whereas  the  im- 
plicit  expectations  formation  mechanism  of  the  MPS  is  closer  to  an 
adaptive expectation  mechanism. If  we now consider the much simpler 
Cagan model,  we  find that it  is stable under  rational expectations but 
unstable  under  adaptive  expectations if  expectations adapt  “too  fast.” 
For the same reason, our model is stable and the MPS is unstable. 
Although, in principle, the current equilibrium depends on all antici- 
pated  future values  of  the exogenous  variables,  agents  are assumed in 
the simulations to have a horizon  of  only  (!) 200 quarters. A simula- 
tion must  therefore specify at  any time the anticipations for all future 
values for all exogenous variables for the following 200 quarters. 
The Policy Experiment 
The experiment will consist of  a decrease in nominal money of  5%, 
announced n periods in advance. This experiment is shown graphically 
in figure 3.1. The number of  periods, n, between the announcement and 
implementation, will be taken to be either zero (in which case the policy 
is unanticipated), five, or fifteen quarters. 
Two simplifying assumptions will be made: If  the decrease in money 
is  realized  through  an open  market  operation,  the  increase in  govern- 
ment  bonds  may  have  an  effect  on  spending.  It will  be  assumed  that 88  Olivier Jean Blanchard 
I  I  I 
0  t-n  t  quarters 
Fig. 3.1  The behavior of  nominal money 
in  this  case the increase in wealth  in  the form of  government bonds is 
exactly offset by the increase in tax liabilities and has no effect on spend- 
ing.  Thus, for simplicity,  the real value of  bonds  (divided by  physical 
capital) and structure of  anticipated taxes will remain unchanged in the 
simulation. Capital will  be  assumed to grow at a constant steady state 
rate.  Thus,  the  effects  of  changes  in  investment  spending  on  capital 
accumulation will not be taken into account. 
4.  Monetary Policy with Exogenous Prices 
In this  section, prices  are assumed to be exogenous and growing  at 
the steady state rate of  inflation, 4%. The decrease in  nominal money 
of  5% in one quarter implies here a permanent decrease in real money 
of  5%. 
It  is  clear that the “steady state” of  this  section is not a true steady 
state, for  output may  be  permanently  different  from its normal level. 
This section is, however, useful to characterize the dynamics of  aggre- 
gate demand, independent of  the particular  formalization of  aggregate 
supply; in  particular it  shows clearly  the interaction between  the stock 
market, output, and the real short-term rate of  interest. 
The “Steady State” 
Given  prices,  the steady state is characterized by  two relations; first, 
wealth determines output. From equation  (5),  in steady state (deleting 
the symbol t)  : 
y =  .687 +  .562 h +  .198 4. 
Second, output determines profit  and labor income and the real interest 
rate together with  the real money stock; this in turn determines wealth: 
T  -  -.095  +  .117 y  q=- 
r +  .075 -  --.410  (m  -  p) -  .675 +  179 y 89  The Monetary Mechanism in the Light of Rational Expectations 
yd  -  .043 +  .030 y  h= r -i-  .075 -  -.410  (m  -  p) -  .675 +  179  y 
A  lower  real  money  stock  leads  to both higher  interest  and lower 
profit, thus lower wealth and output. A 5% decrease in real money de- 
creases y  by 6.2%, q by  20%, h by  10%;  the real short-term rate in- 
creases by  50%, from  1% to 1.499%. 
The Dynamic Effects of  an Unanticipated Decrease in Real Money 
The results  of  an unanticipated  decrease in real money are reported 
in  table 3.2. The main conclusion is that, in this case, the adjustment is 
very  fast: 65%  of  the  adjustment  in  output  takes  place  in  the  first 
quarter; the  adjustment  is nearly complete in four quarters. 
This  fast  adjustment  differs  drastically  from  the effects of  a  similar 
change in nominal money in existing models  (see again Corrado 1976 
for the effects of  a similar policy in the  MPS with  exogenous prices): 
these models indicate a slow adjustment of  the economy to a change in 
nominal money. There are probably three main reasons for this differ- 
ence.  The first  is  the  assumption  about expectations  and  is  probably 
the most important one. The second comes from the fact that a decrease 
in the money stock in this and, say, the MPS model may in fact corre- 
spond  to  two  different  experiments.  The fast  adjustment  is  obtained 
here under the assumptions that the decrease in money is both unantici- 
pated and believed to be permanent. It is possible, for example, that the 
decrease  in  money  considered  in  the  MPS  is  of  a  different  nature 
(implicitly, for the model does not  distinguish between  anticipated and 
unanticipated, permanent  and temporary). The underlying  assumptions 
may, for example, be that the decrease is  initially thought of  as tempo- 
rary  by  agents  and that  only over time  do agents think  of  it  as being 
Table 3.2  The Effect of  an Unanticipated Decrease in the Nominal Money 
Stock of  5% with Prices Exogenous, Announced and 
Implemented in the First Quarter. 
Quarters  y  r  7r  Y 
0  1.377  1.000%  .070  .847 
1  1.319  3.947  .057  .666  Announcement/Implementation 
2  1.302  1.691  .056  .674 
3  1.296  1.593  .059  .675 
4  1.291  1.503  .059  .676 
5  1.291  1.498  .059  .676 
6  1.291  1.499  .060  .676 90  Olivier Jean Blanchard 
permanent; this may partially explain the difference between the models. 
The third  reason  is  that  inventories  are taken  as exogenous  in this 
model,  whereas  they  are  endogenous  in  the  MPS.  Intuition  (supple- 
mented by the study of  the effects of  inventory behavior in Blinder and 
Fischer  1978)  suggests that the  endogeneity  of  inventories may  lead 
to a smaller initial response and a slower adjustment process. 
Consider  now  the  dynamics  of  output,  wealth  and  the  short-term 
rate:  After the decrease in  money, agents anticipate both  a higher se- 
quence of  interest rates and a lower sequence of  profit and labor income. 
Both  effects decrease wealth  immediately.  The stock  market  drops by 
as much as 21 % . This in turn decreases spending and output over time, 
decreasing  income  and  validating  the  initial  anticipations  of  lower 
profit  and labor income. 
Over  time  the  decrease  in  output  reduces  the  demand for money, 
leading  to  a  decrease  in  the  interest  rate.  The decrease  in  profit  is 
initially large because profit depends both on the level and the rate of 
change  of  output.  After the  first  quarter,  output  decreases  but  at  a 
slower  rate; this  affects  profit  in  opposite  directions.  The  combined 
decrease  in  the  relevant  sequence of  discount  rates  and  the  approxi- 
mately constant  sequence of  profits lead to a slight increase in  q over 
time.  Initially  q  decreases  by  more  than  its  loqg-run  change  and 
after that increases slightly. 
Therefore,  not  only  the  speed  but  the  qualitative  behavior  of  this 
model  is  different  from  the  behavior  of  existing  models;  rather  than 
slowly adjusting over time to the higher short-term  real rate, the stock 
market reacts immediately and strongly to the decrease in  money. 
The Dynamic Effects of  a Decrease in Real Money, Announced in 
Quarter 1 and Implemented in  Quarter 6 
Table  3.3  presents  the  behavior  of  output,  the  real  interest  rate, 
profit, and the stock market. 
The announcement  is itself  contractionary.  The stock market  drops 
by 18% in the quarter of  the announcement. This is due to anticipations 
of  both  higher  interest  rates  and  lower  profits.  This leads  to  a rapid 
decrease in output:  52% of the long-run change takes place in the first 
quarter and the decrease in output between the announcement and the 
implementation is  larger than its  long-run  change.  Over time, between 
the announcement and the actual implementation, output  is decreasing 
but the real money stock is still constant. Because of  the lower trans- 
action  demand  for  money,  the  short-term  rate  decreases.  Thus  the 
stock market  and the short rate move in  opposite directions. 
As the  actual implementation becomes  closer  in  time,  the sequence 
of  higher  short-term  rates  also  becomes  closer,  explaining the further 91  The Monetary Mechanism in the Light of Rational Expectations 
Table 3.3  The Effect of  a Decrease in the Nominal Money Stock of  5% 
with Prices Exogenous, Announced in Quarter 1 and 
Implemented in the Sixth Quarter. 
Quarters  Y  r  7r  4 
0  1.377  1.000%  .070  347 
1  1.332  .183  .060  .687  Announcement 
2  1.311  -.179  .058  .684 
3  1.303  -.334  .059  .681 
4  1.295  -  .474  .059  .678 
5  1.29 1  -  .544  .059  .674 





1.290  1.495  .060  .676 
1.29 1  1.497  .060  .676 
1.29 1  1.499  .060  .676 
1.291  1.499  .060  .676 
decline  of  wealth  and  thus output.  These capital losses  are expected; 
note, however,  that they  are relatively  small compared with the initial 
unexpected drop; they are equal to less than 1% per quarter. 
At  the time  of  the implementation, the real money  stock decreases, 
leading  to  a  very  large  increase  in  the  short-term  rate.  Because  this 
change  was  expected,  however,  little  else  happens:  output  and  the 
stock market  are already close to their  equilibrium values; output even 
increases slightly after the decrease in real money. 
The results of  this section have been derived under the assumption of 
exogenous prices and thus of  the possibility that output may be perma- 
nently  different  from  its  long-run  value.  This  assumption  is  now 
relaxed. 
5.  Monetary Policy with Endogenous Prices 
Prices are now endogenous  and their behavior is described by  equa- 
tions (13) and  (15). The value of  is  .20, unless otherwise indicated: 
20% of  the desired adjustment of  prices takes place during a quarter. 
A change in  nominal money has no effect in the long run  as prices 
adjust,  leaving  real  money  unchanged.  Thus  only  the  dynamics  of 
adjustment are of  interest. 
The Dynamic Effects of  an Unanticipated Decrease in Nominal Money 
ticipated decrease in nominal money. 
Figure 3.2 gives the behavior of  y,  q, r, and T  in response to an unan- IACROSSI  PERIOD 
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What  is  the  initial  impact  of  the  decrease  in  money?  Again,  the 
combination of  lower anticipated profits and higher real rates decreases 
wealth; the stock  market drops but  since the economy  is  expected  to 
return to steady state, profits  and interest rates are expected  to return 
to their  steady  state values; the drop is  thus  only  5%  in  the  quarter 
of the policy change compared with 21 % ,  in the exogenous price case. 
The behavior of  y  and q in both cases is given in columns 1, 2, 5, and 
6 in table 3.4. 
The smaller  drop in  the  stock  market  and  in  output must  be con- 
trasted  with  the  increase  of  the  short-term  real  rate,  which  is  larger 
than  in the exogenous price case:  the short-term  real rate increases to 
6.311%  compared  with  3.497%.  The reason  is  the  presence  of  the 
Mundell  effect:  in  addition  to the  decrease  in  real  money,  which  in- 
creases the nominal rate, there is  expected lower inflation, which, given 
the  nominal rate,  increases  the  real  rate.  This  higher  short-term  real 
rate, however, is  not  expected to remain: real rates are expected to be 
lower in the future than in the exogenous price case. This explains why 
the decrease in  wealth is smaller than in the exogenous price case. 
Over  time,  both  the  real  money  stock  and  the  real  rate  return to 
their  steady  state  values;  wealth  increases.  There  are  initially  two 
opposite  effects on  output: the  initial  decrease in wealth  tends to de- 
crease it; the following increase  tends to increase it. The second effect 
is more powerful for y =  .20, but, as shown in table 3.4, the first effect 
dominates  initially  for  y =  .lo: output  decreases  in  the  first  two 
quarters before it increases again. 
Most  of  the  effect  of  the  policy  on real  variables  has  disappeared 
after  10 quarters:  although prices are still  10% away from their steady 
state value, output is less than 2% away from its steady state value. 
The Dynamic Effects of  a Decrease in Nominal Money, Announced in 
Quarter  1 and Implemented in Quarter 6 
Figure 3.3 gives the behavior of  y, q, r, and T in response to a de- 
crease in money anticipated 5 quarters in advance. The results may be 
compared  with  the  results  of the  exogenous  price  case  presented  in 
table 3.3. There are two mechanisms  at work: the first one is the one 
described  in the exogenous  price  case, the second one is  the behavior 
of  desired  and actual prices.  Through the first one, the  announcement 
leads  to an anticipated recession  and thus a decrease in wealth  at the 
time  of  the  announcement;  this  implies  a  rapid  decrease  in  output. 
There  are  contradictory  effects on  the  stock  market  between  the  an- 
nouncement  and  implementation : the  higher  sequence  of  anticipated 
profit  tends  to  increase it  but  the  relevant  sequence  of  discount rates 
changes over  time  in  a complex way,  as can be seen in  figure 3.3.  In 95  The Monetary Mechanism in the Light of  Rational Expectations 
Table 3.4  The Effects of  an Unanticipated Decrease in Nominal Money 
in the First Quarter: the first five quarters. 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
y=o  y =  .10  y =  .20 
Quarter  (fixed prices) 
Y  4  Y  4  Y  4 
0  1.377  347  1.377  .847  1.377  .a47 
1  1.319  .666  1.350  .799  1.356  .a12 
2  1.302  .674  1.348  309  1.357  324 
3  1.296  .675  1.350  314  1.360  330 
4  1.29 1  .676  1.351  317  1.363  333 
5  1.29  1  .676  1.354  321  1.366  336 
6  1.29 1  .676  1.356  324  1.368  339 
this  case,  the  net  effect is  to increase wealth  slightly between  the first 
quarter and  the sixth. 
The  implementation  again  has  no  noticeable  effect,  except  on  the 
short-term  real rate. After that, wealth  and output increase slowly back 
to their steady state value. 
The second mechanism is through prices:  after the announcement, the 
desired price  adjusts to its lower  level; this  leads in turn to an adjust- 
ment of  the actual price  (see above). When nominal  money decreases, 
the  actual  price  has  already  decreased  (compared  with  its trend)  and 
this leads to a smaller decrease in real money. This reduces the effect of 
nominal  money  on  output:  when  unanticipated,  the  policy  led  to  a 
maximum  decrease  in  output  of  1.5%; when  it  is  anticipated  five 
quarters in advance, the maximum decrease in output is only 1.1  % . 
The Dynamic Effects of  a Decrease in Nominal Money, Announced in 
Quarter 1 and Implemented  in Quarter 16 
If  a decrease in nominal money is anticipated so long in advance, we 
would not expect it to have much effect. This is the reason for consider- 
ing this case. The results are given in figure 3.4. 
The effects on y and q are indeed very small. The maximum decrease 
in  output,  which  takes  place  at the time of  the  actual implemcntation 
in quarter 16, is of  .7%. 
The complexity  of  the  different  effects  of  anticipated  interest  rates 
and  anticipated  profit  income on the stock  market  is  clearly  indicated 
by the behavior of  the stock market between the announcement and the 
implementation.  The rest  of  the effect is otherwise qualitatively similar 
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Fig. 3.3A-D  The effects of a decrease  in  moncy anticipated  5 quarters 
in  advance.  (The first  vertical  line indicates the quarter in 
which the decrease is announced. The second vertical  line 
indicates the quarter in  which it is implemented.) ,*....*..-.+-...+....*--- 
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Fig. 3.4A-D  The effects of  a decrease in money anticipated  15 quarters 
in advance.  (The first vertical line indicates the quarter in 
which the decrease is announced.  The second  vertical  line 
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6.  Conclusion 
The purpose of  the paper was to show that a structural model could 
be specified, estimated, and used to study the effects of  a policy change 
under the assumption of rational expectations. What is the verdict? 
1. Specification and estimation of  a model of  aggregate demand which 
should  be approximately  invariant  to  policy  rules  does  seem  possible. 
The model  used  in this paper stresses the role of  observable variables, 
such as the stock market, which contains information  about agents’ ex- 
pectations; the result  of such  a specification  is to minimize  the number 
of  parameters to estimate  in  equations with unobservable  expectational 
variables.  Given  that,  estimation  does  not  present  particular  technical 
difficulties. A  serious problem-not  directly  related  to the assumption 
of  rational expectations-comes,  however, from the dubious identifica- 
tion  status  of  some  of  the  estimated  equations:  few  of  the potential 
instruments  seem to be statistically exogenous. 
It is, in fact, impossible to specify a model involving only observable 
variables.  Because  there  is  no market  for human wealth,  assumptions 
about  expectations  must  be  made  to  estimate  the  effect  of  human 
wealth on consumption spending. In the same way, the specification and 
estimation of  inventory investment, which is not explained at this stage, 
would require the use of  unobservable  variables  such as sales expecta- 
tions  and, thus,  an  assumption  about  the  formation  of  these  expecta- 
tions  in  the  sample  period.  Specification  of  such  relations  does  not 
present  particular  problems  and  if  rational  expectations  are assumed, 
the implied  cross-equation  constraints  should help  rather  than  hinder 
estimation  (Wallis  1977 or Sargent  1978). 
Even  a  detailed  and reliable  model  of  aggregate demand  is  of  little 
use without a model of  aggregate supply. Although the model of  supply 
used  here  has  both  theoretically  and  empirically  desirable  properties, 
it is neither derived from theory nor estimated. The question of  whether 
we  can  specify  and  estimate  a  policy  invariant  model  of  aggregate 
supply is  therefore not  answered by this paper. 
2.  Once a  model  is  specified and  estimated,  the technical  problems 
involved  in  obtaining  policy  simulations  under  the  assumption  of  ra- 
tional  expectations  are easily  solved.  A  policy  simulation  requires  the 
specification for  all  simulation  periods  of  all  current  expectations  for 
all future values of  all exogenous variables. Although  this implies more 
cumbersome  simulations  than  those  in  existing  models which  only  re- 
quire current values  of  the exogenous variables, this is a logical conse- 
quence of  the assumption of  rational expectations. 
The policies  considered  here  are  both  simple  and  deterministic  but 
there are no conceptual or technical problems in considering feedback or 
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3. Although it would be unwise to take the exact quantitative results 
of  the simulations too literally, the following qualitative features of  the 
adjustment process after a change in nominal money are probably fairly 
robust: 
If  prices  were  exogenous,  the  adjustment  of  the  real  variables  to 
their new equilibrium level would  be  fast, in response  to a permanent 
change in  money. With  endogenous prices,  an unanticipated  change in 
nominal  money,  assumed  to  be  permanent,  has  its  largest  effect  on 
output  and  the  stock  market  at  or  shortly  after  the  implementation; 
there is no slow transmission from short- to long-term rates, to the stock 
market, and finally to output. 
When  a  policy  is  anticipated,  the  announcement  itself  has  a  large 
effect  on  the  stock  market  and  on  output; the  actual  implementation 
affects the short-term interest rate but has little noticeable effect on the 
path  of  output  and  wealth.  Finally,  the  longer  a  change  in  nominal 
money has been anticipated, the smaller are its effects on real variables. 
Appendix 
Systems (16) and  (17) are of  the form: 
where 
X  is a vector of  n variables predetermined at t 
Y is a vector of  m variables not predetermined at t 
[  is a vector of  k exogenous variables 
X  =  Xo at time to 
A, fi are ((n+m>  x  (fZ+m))  and ((n+m) 
X k)  , respectively. 
First decompose this system A and R as follows: 
A is similar to a diagonal matrix A: A =  B A B-l 
A is ordered by increasing absolute value of  the char- 
B and A are partitioned as follows: 
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For these systems to be stable, hl must include all the roots inside the 
unit circle, and A2 include all the roots outside. 
Then for t > to (see Blanchard  1980). 
(A1 1  Xt =  B1lAIBil-lXt-l+  Gtt-1 
m 
-  A12C22-l  2  A2-i-1(C21R1 
i=O 
+  C22fL) t-1tt-1  ti 
and 
m 
-  c22-1  2  A2-i-1(C21.nl +  C22fMtSt+%. 
i=O 
An  algorithm  giving the  values  for Xt and  Y, given the sequence of 
actual and anticipated Tt’s is available upon request. 
Comment  Bennett T. McCallum 
The basic  purpose  of  Blanchard’s  study  is  to  specify  and  estimate  a 
macroeconometric model that can be used for valid policy simulations- 
that is,  simulations that are  not open to Lucas’s  (1976) fundamental 
critique. It seems clear that this would be, if  successful, a very useful 
project. There are a few such models in existence (Barro 1978, Sargent 
1976a,  and  Taylor  1979b,  for  example), but  Blanchard’s  aggregate 
demand  sector  is  specified with  considerably more detail  than  in  any 
of  these  others.13 Let  us  then  consider  whether  his  approach  seems 
likely to prove successful. 
I  shall begin  by noting the way  in which Blanchard has  attempted 
to build policy-invariance  into the model’s  structure. The main  step- 
I am  indebted  to  Robert  Flood  and Peter  Garber for  helpful  discussions  and 
to the National  Science Foundation  for financial  support  (SOC  76-81422). 
13. Of  course  the  Barro  and  Sargent  models  are  ones  in  which  the  choice 
among  systematic  policy  feedback  rules  has  no  effect  on  output  or  unemploy- 
ment processes. Taylor’s, like Blanchard‘s, leaves more scope for activist stabiliza- 
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in conjunction with the adoption of  the rational expectations hypothesis 
-is  to make ht and qt  (the present values of  expected future real wage 
and real profit streams) the principal determinants of  consumption  and 
investment  demand,  respectively.  Policy  changes  should  then  bring 
about changes in expected future wage and profit variables  and conse- 
quently,  by  way  of  h, and  qt, current  consumption  and  investment. 
While  one  could  quibble  over  details,  this  general  approach  seems 
reasonably satisfactory in principle,14  so the issue becomes one of  empiri- 
cal  implementation.  I  shall  therefore  devote  some  attention  to  the 
model’s estimation, which is described in a separate paper by Blanchard 
and Wyplosz (1978)  .15 
In any analysis in which one adopts the rational expectations hypoth- 
esis, and accordingly abstains from the use of  distributed-lag “proxies” 
for  expectational  variables,  estimation  will  necessarily  involve  some 
technique that is not entirely  “standard”  in macroeconomics. In trying 
to discern how Blanchard has  proceeded in this regard, one gradually 
becomes  aware that  a significant part  of  his  strategy  is  to design the 
model so that unobservable  expectational  variables  appear in very few 
places. In fact, they appear only in the arbitrage equations, those desig- 
nated  (8) and  (10). Furthermore, these  equations include  a minimal 
number of  parameters-and  the values  1.04 in (8) and 0.093 in (10) 
are simply unit-of-measurement  conversion factors that do not need to 
be obtained by  estimation. Thus the only parameter estimated in either 
(8) or (10) is the risk premium,  denoted p. The value was estimated 
as 0.075 in  (8) and  assumed to be applicable in  (10)  as well. This 
strategy  for  minimizing the  number  of  parameters  in  equations  with 
expectational variables must be regarded  as highly ingenious. 
The procedure actually used to estimate p does not, however, strike 
me as desirable. Blanchard  and Wyplosz in effect by writing 
4(tqt+i -  qt) +  1.04~t 
qt  -  rt,  (1)  P= 
14. This statement  refers only  to the  aggregate  demand  portion  of  the model. 
I  shall  have  more  to say  about  aggregate  supply  below.  In  addition,  it  should 
be  mentioned  that  the  current  version  of  the  model  does  not  include  tax  rate 
variables  in  several  places  in  which  they  would  be  necessary  for fiscal  policy 
simulations.  Indeed,  estimation  has  probably  suffered from these  omissions  since 
tax  schedules  were  altered  during  the  sample  period.  But  Blanchard  is  fully 
aware of  this problem  and will no doubt be eliminating it in future versions. 
15. I  have  little  to  say  about  the  numerical  results  of  the  estimation.  TWO 
items  should,  however,  be  mentioned.  First,  the  estimates  of  the  autoregressive 
parameters  in  the  structural equations  estimated  by  Fair’s  (1970)  procedure  are 
very  high:  0.83 to  0.96. Second, current  income variables enter strongly  in  both 
the  investment  and  consumption  functions,  despite  their  absence  from the  theo- 
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where rt =  profit per unit of  capital, rt =  expected real rate of  return 
on Treasury  bills, and  =  the value of  “Tobin’s q”  (as calculated 
by  von  Furstenberg  1977) for  period  t +  1 expected as  of  period  t. 
Next  they  delete the  capital gains  term  (tqt+l  -  qt)/qt,  arguing  that 
its sample average should be small, adopt Nordhaus’s  (1974) estimate 
of the mean value of  Tt for 1953-73,  and compute sample period mean 
values for qt and rt, using for the latter the ex post real rate it -  (pt+l 
-  pt) instead of  it -  ( gt+  I -  pt)  . Finally, they substitute these three 
mean values into expression  (1)  and use the resulting number as their 
estimate, p. This use  of  the  ex post real  rate  and the  deletion of  the 
capital gains term are perhaps justifiable, given the rational expectations 
condition, so p may be statistically consistent, But since the estimation 
procedure ignores period-to-period interactions among the various terms 
of  (1  ), it would appear to be unusually inefficient.16 In addition, it does 
not  permit  the calculation of  a standard error for p. Thus there is  no 
way  of  telling,  from the Blanchard  and Wyplosz  paper, whether their 
estimate is  significantly different from  zero-or,  for that  matter, from 
unity. 
The most serious problem with the model’s estimation pertains, how- 
ever, to the consumption function. The source of  the problem is that ht 
is unobservable in the following specification: 
Ct 1  aiht +  azwt +  a3~t-i  +  a4Ydt 
+  asydt-i +  Et. 
How, then,  is  estimation effected? In fact, the procedure  is to choose 
units of  measurement so that the sample mean value of  the unobservable 
ht must be 1.0, and then simply estimate 
ct =  a, +  a2wt +  a3wt -  1 +  aaydt 
+  a5ydt-1 +  Et, 
using the resulting constant term as an estimate of  the slope parameter 
for  ht. Clearly,  this  procedure  must  be  inconsistent,  because  of  the 
omitted variable. And the omission seems particularly inappropriate in 
the context of  a study focusing upon  aggregate demand: the consump- 
tion  function  is  estimated by  a procedure  that pretends  that its main 
driving variable is not a variable at all. Blanchard and Wyplosz express 
the intention of  using a more satisfactory procedure in the future, how- 
ever. 
A  few words  should  perhaps  be  added  about identification.  I have 
found rather persuasive the contention of  Sims (1979) that the appro- 
16. There is, of  course, no attempt to exploit or test cross-equation restrictions 
implied by  the  rational  expectations hypothesis. On this subject,  see Wallis  1977. 105  The Monetary Mechanism in the Light of  Rational Expectations 
priate identification  criterion for dynamic macroeconometric  models is 
the  one developed  by  Hatanaka  (19751, which  does  not  assume  that 
distributed-lag  lengths  and  serial  correlation  properties  are  known  a 
priori. Also hard to resist is Sims's  argument that statistical exogeneity 
tests should be passed by variables classified as exogenous for purposes 
of  estimation  and identification.  In fact, Blanchard  and Wyplosz carry 
out such tests  for variables  used  as exogenous  instruments  (i.e.,  first- 
stage regressors)  in  estimation,  a  step that  should be widely regarded 
as commendable. But the set of  instrumental  variables  ultimately  used 
is  not  reassuring. There are six in  this  set, but two1'  actually fail the 
exogeneity tests and, of  the remaining four, one is the federal profit tax 
rate while another is the total profit tax rate-which  would hardly seem 
to qualify as distinct variables. Furthermore, the final two in the set are 
government spending and exports. But in Blanchard's  model these ap- 
parently  enter  only  in  the  expenditure  equation  (5), where  they  are 
additive components of  the variable xt.  Perhaps one of  the two should 
appear in some additional equation that is not listed explicitly as part of 
the  model.l*  But,  if  not,  these  two  variables  can  only  count  as one 
for the purpose of  identification. Consequently, the system contains only 
two  or perhaps  three  truly  exogenous  variables.  But the  consumption 
function includes four endogenous variables (counting ht)  ,  even with the 
current real interest  rate excluded, so its identification status should be 
regarded as dubious.19 This argument should not be taken as a criticism 
of  Blanchard, whose practice is more conscientious than is usually found 
in  empirical  work,20 but  as  an  indication  of  the inherent  difficulty of 
reliably identifying structural equations. 
My  final point  concerns the  aggregate  supply  specification in Blan- 
chard's  model.21 At first glance, it  appears similar to  one that I have 
used  (McCallum  1978), for mine includes  a price adjustment equation 
exactly like Blanchard's  (14), 
Pt -  Pt--1 =  Y(P"t -  Pt-1) 
O<yll, 
17. The  federal  personal  tax  rate  and  the  actual  (realized)  required  reserve 
ratio. 
18. That there  must  be  some  such  equations  is  evident  from the list  of  vari- 
ables  tested  as  potential  instruments,  as  most  of  these  do  not  appear at  all  in 
Blanchard's  equations ( 1  ) to ( 11 ). 
19. The  same  is  true  (as Blanchard  and  Wyplosz  point  out)  for the money 
demand function. 
20. Also commendable is the practice of  testing for parameter  constancy  across 
sample subperiods. 
21.  The  following comments  do  not  distinguish between  the three versions  of 
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with p*t defined as the (log of  the) price level that would equate aggre- 
gate  demand  and  supply.  But  my  model  is  one  in  which  monetary 
policy  can  affect output  only  by  creating monetary  surprises-despite 
the slow price adjustments that take place with small values of  7-while 
Blanchard’s simultations show output effects without monetary surprises. 
So the specifications must differ in some important way. 
The main difference, it turns out, is that under my  specification, ag- 
gregate demand is  a distinct variable from aggregate supply or 
In most  periods  the  two will  differ  in  value,  with  inventory  holdings 
fluctuating  as  a  result.  In  Blanchard’s  model,  by  contrast,  the  same 
symbol  (yt)  denotes both output and quantity demanded, so the two are 
always equal. They can both differ from their common steady state value, 
but not from each other. 
Now it would seem that, if one is going to construct a model in which 
price level stickiness leads to discrepancies between  aggregate demand 
and supply in some sense, he would want to permit output to differ from 
quantity demanded. These are, after all, supposed to be determined by 
different agents  (to some extent)  and in response to different stimuli. 
But having said this, I must  add that my  model, like Blanchard’s,  has 
not been justified by any explicit profit-maximizing analysis of inventory- 
holding producer  behavior. Such an analysis has recently been worked 
out,  however,  by  Blinder  and  Fischer  (1978).  Their  model  features 
profit-maximizing  responses  of  output  and  inventory  holdings-and 
therefore prices-to  changes in aggregate demand.23  It would seem that 
an  aggregate  supply  function  based  on this  sort of  analysis  would  be 
preferable  to  the  one used  by  Blanchard.  In particular,  it should  be 
more likely to be invariant  to policy choices than the one used  in his 
simulations. 
In  summary,  then,  I  have  definite  reservations  about  Blanchard’s 
supply specification, his model’s identifiability, and some of  the estima- 
tion procedures.  Consequently, it  appears  that his project has not yet 
been brought to a successful conclusion. Nevertheless, the model in its 
present form represents an imaginative and interesting beginning. Study- 
ing Blanchard’s paper was, for me, a pleasure. 
22. With  output  a  distinct  variable,  another  behavioral  relation  is  needed 
to  close  the  model.  In my  paper,  output  is  determined  by  a  Lucas-type  supply 
function.  Accordingly,  even  with  ( 14), systematic  monetary  policy  cannot  affect 
output. 
23. In the  first  version  of  the  Blinder-Fischer  model,  monetary  policy has no 
effects on output. They also present a version in which there are “non-neutralities,” 
but these seem to reflect effects on the “full-employment’’ output level, rather than 
the  discrepancy  between  actual  and  full  employment  levels.  Thus  the  Blinder- 
Fischer nonneutralities do not provide  theoretical support for activist stabilization 
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Comment  Michael Parkin 
Blanchard’s  paper  is  a useful,  compact  summary  of  two  other papers 
(Blanchard 1978, Blanchard and Wyplosz  1978). It sets out the struc- 
ture, together with numerical parameter estimates, of  the aggregate de- 
mand side of  a macroeconomic model with five markets-goods,  money, 
bonds,  equity,  and labor. The model is  “completed” by adding  an ad 
hoc aggregate supply  assumption that the price level gradually adjusts 
toward  its  equilibrium  level.  Simulation  experiments  are  conducted 
which take account of  the policy regime on the expectations of  agents, 
thereby  overcoming the  Lucas  problem.  Attention  is  focused  on the 
stock market and real output responses. 
It is possible to get a better feel for how the model hangs together 
and how  it  works by  looking at Blanchard’s  earlier paper.  The basic 
structural equations describing the goods market may be summarized as 
(1)  9 =  -  by +  81, 
where  y =  real  output,  q =  the  stock  market  price  of  capital,  and 
g =  government expenditures, less tax receipts; (+,  a, b > 0. This is a dy- 
namic version of  the IS curve of  a standard macroeconomic model. The 
term in parentheses  (a9 -  by +  g) is simply the excess of  expenditure 
plans over current receipts. The term a9 can be thought of  as investment 
and by as savings, with g representing the net injection of  government 
purchases. Thus equation  (1) simply says that output will rise propor- 
tionately to the excess of  current expenditure plans over current receipts. 
(2) 
where r =  the nominal rate of  interest, m =  the logarithm of  the money 
supply, and p =  the logarithm of  the price level. This is simply the LM 
curve. It has no inherent dynamics. 
Next there is  perfect arbitrage between bonds and equities so that 
Asset equilibrium is summarized by 
r =  cy -  h(m -  p), 
4e  a0 +  WY  r=-+ 
4  4 
9 
where the superscript e denotes the expectation of  the relevant variable. 
The second term in this equation  (ao  +  aly)/q  represents the rate of 
profit, which  is postulated to be an increasing function of  output. This 
simply says that the rate of  profit plus the expected rate of  capital gain 
(or loss)  on equities  must  equal the current rate on bonds.  Expecta- 
tions are rational so that 
(4)  46 =  4. 
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The model is completed by  adding a fifth equation, namely, 
where p* is the equilibrium (logarithm) of  the price level. 
The model is most simply analyzed if  we consider first the case where 
y =  0 and therefore where the price level is stuck at its existing value. 
In this case the subsystem of  equations (l),  (21,  (3), and  (4) deter- 
mines the level of  output, the interest  rate, and the stock market value 
of  the capital stock for a given g, m,  and p.  Figure 3.5 summarizes this 
model.  Equation  (1) can  be  plotted  as  the  IS  curve  for  j, =  0  and 
equations (2), (3), and  (4) used to eliminate the interest rate and Ge 
and plotted for 4 =  0. (There are in fact two cases of  the 4 =  0 locus 
depending on whether a rise in the profit rate raises or lowers the inter- 
est rate in equilibrium. The case we work with is that which the empiri- 
cal results correspond to.)  The only expectational variable in this model 
is  the stock market  value of  the capital stock. There is no uncertainty 
explicitly introduced,  and therefore we have the deterministic  analogue 
of  rational expectations, namely, perfect foresight. All the paths  of ad- 
justment of  this economy turn out to be perfect  foresight  paths. How- 
ever, if  we impose the usual  terminal conditions to achieve uniqueness, 
the economy will  travel  along  an arm such as  aa’,  achieving a steady 
state at E. 
If  this economy is  disturbed by  say a rise in the money stock, then 
the  4 =  0 locus  shifts  (fig.  3.6)  from  that  marked  M =  Mo to that 
marked  M =  MI. The initial  equilibrium  was  point  E  and  the  new 
equilibrium is  B. How the economy moves from E to B depends on the 
timing of  the announcement and the implementation of  the change in the 
money  stock.  Blanchard  analyzes  several  cases.  The most  simple  and 
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Fig. 3.6  Effects  of  the change in the money stock 
direct is that of  a previously  unanticipated  rise in the money stock. Up 
to some  date, the money  stock  was  at Mo. At  the date of  shock  the 
money stock is  increased to MI,  and it is known that it will be perma- 
nently  held  at MI  thereafter.  At that  instant the economy jumps  to A 
and thereafter  follows the trajectory marked from A to B. If  the rise in 
the  money  stock  is  announced  ahead  of  time,  at the moment  of  an- 
nouncement  the stock market will jump to a position such as D, and in 
the transition between the announcement and the implementation of  the 
money  stock  change  the economy  will  follow  the  trajectory  DC. The 
money stock actually rises to MI at point C and thereafter the economy 
follows the trajectory CB. The further ahead the money supply increase 
is announced relative to its implementation, the closer will the economy 
move to traveling along the IS curve. In the limit of  an announcement 
an  infinite  amount  of  time  ahead  of  the change  the  economy  would 
simply  gradually  track  up the  IS curve  and,  at the moment  when  the 
money stock was increased, the economy would be at point B. 
Blanchard’s  numerical  simulations based  on  alternative  assumptions 
about the lead time of  the anticipation illustrate the differences that arise 
in the alternative cases. It is clear that the more abrupt a policy change 
is, the more overshooting we would  expect to observe in the stock mar- 
ket, with  stock market  expectations  being regressive  once the economy 
is on the stable arm following the actual change in the policy variable. 
In all this  discussion  the price level has been held  constant. It is of 
some  importance  to analyze the effects of  allowing  the price  level  to 
change simultaneously with the movements of output in the stock market 
index.  Analytically it is easier to get  a feel for what is going  on if  we 
examine the special case of  y =  co  (equivalent  to the y =  1 in the dis- 
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Figure 3.7 illustrates the economy in full equilibrium with output at its 
equilibrium level y*.  The stock market  equilibrium value q*  is deter- 
mined by  the point  at which the j, =  0 locus cuts the full employment 
line. The LM cum arbitrage condition determines the price level, which 
ensures the the q =  0 locus is compatible with q*  and y*. Now let there 
be an unanticipated  change in  the money  stock. Recall, however,  that 
once the money stock has changed it is understood  that it is now at a 
different level forever.  What does this do to the equilibrium  displayed 
in figure 3.7? The answer clcarly is nothing. The rise in the money stock 
would  shift  the  LM arbitrage  q =  0  condition  to the  northeast.  The 
rise in the price level would, however, bring it back to its original posi- 
tion. There would thus be no dynamics  at all to investigate. 
In between the extreme cases of  no price adjustment and perfect price 
adjustment,  if  the  price  level  is  permitted  to  move  gradually  (and 
Blanchard  allows it to close the equilibrium gap by  93  each quarter), 
then  the  dynamics  become  somewhat  complicated  to deal  with  ana- 
lytically. There are, however, some strong and persistent real effects fol- 
lowing a monetary shock that occur in  the numerical simulations pre- 
sented. 
It is clear that the source of  these real  effects is the specified aggre- 
gate  supply  assumption.  Blanchard’s  view  is  that  the  data are inade- 
quate to discriminate amongst alternative aggregate supply formulations 
and therefore the ad hoc assumption used is justified. This may turn out 
to be correct. At the  same time  it  should  be  noted  that the key per- 
sistence results arise from ad hoc, and therefore the most unsatisfactory, 
aspect of  Blanchard’s model. Were it not for sluggish price adjustment, 
the model would produce very different price, output, and stock market 
dynamics.  Furthermore,  it  is  interesting  to  note  that the  rational  ex- 
Fig. 3.7 
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pectations content of  this model bears no relation at all to the standard 
rational  expectations  models  of  price  and  output  determination.  The 
expectations dynamics in Blanchard’s analysis concern the stock market 
price and not the general price level. In fact expectations of  the general 
price level play virtually no role in the analysis at all. 
The main virtue of  Blanchard’s work is in showing how in principle 
we  can develop  models that contain rational  expectations  and yet  use 
those models for policy simulation purposes, taking full account of  the 
effects of the change in the policy regime on the particular expectations 
formed. Its substantive contribution to the policy  debate is limited by 
virtue  of  the  unsatisfactorily  ad  hoc  and  untested  assumptions  em- 
ployed  on  the aggregate supply side. It is  in this  area that the major 
research effort is required. 
Comment  David E. Lindsey* 
I  was  encouraged  by  Blanchard’s  paper,  particularly  by  its  emphasis 
upon  adjustment  of  interest  rates  and stock  prices on the basis of  ra- 
tional  expectations  of  the  future course of  economic  variables.  While 
Bennett  McCallum  noted  that  expected-as  opposed  to  observed- 
variables  directly  enter  only in  the  arbitrage equations, he would  not 
deny that the demand  equations include variables  which  are functions 
of  expected variables.  For example, q is  a function of  expected paths 
of  dividend  streams  and  real  discount  rates.  The profession  has been 
tardy in focusing macroeconomic rational expectations theory on finan- 
cial markets  and can, in fact, go considerably further in this area than 
this  paper  does.  I shall  return  to this  point  later.  First,  let me clear 
away some minor underbrush. 
The first point has  to do with 4,  which in Blanchard’s paper is de- 
fined as the real value of  a unit of  physical capital in the stock market, 
or the  nominal  price  of  stocks  divided  by  the  price  of  goods.  His 
arbitrage equation equalizes the real bond rate plus a premium with the 
dividend-price  ratio  plus  the  expected  capital  gains in  this  real stock 
price, q. But, his empirical estimates use Tobin’s q in the consumption 
and investment functions. Tobin’s q is defined as the value of  capital in 
the stock  market  divided by  its  replacement  cost, or-if  a stock is  a 
claim on one unit  of  capital-the  nominal  price  of  stocks  divided by 
the nominal price of  capital goods. 
*The views expressed herein  are entirely mine and do not necessarily represent 
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Unlike the one good economy of Blanchard’s theory, in the real world 
the price  of  capital goods and the  average  price  of  all  goods  are not 
identical  and  do not  move  together.  Thus,  Blanchard‘s  q in the real 
capital gains part of the  arbitrage  equations  represents  a concept dif- 
ferent from Tobin’s q in the estimated demand equations. If  the model 
were to be simulated over the sample period or for policy purposes over 
an actual post-sample period, this inconsistency would cause the model’s 
forecasts to go astray. As it is, Blanchard’s simulations are over hypo- 
thetical periods, and it is implicitly assumed that capital prices  and all 
goods prices  are identical. 
A related problem in my view is that in Blanchard’s simulations, which 
introduce  disturbances to the steady  state of  the  economy, the steady 
state value of  Tobin’s q is assumed to be  .85. This implies that in the 
steady state,  in  which capital is  growing, firms are continually issuing 
85 cents worth of  stock to finance $1 purchases of  capital goods, a not 
very  profitable operation. It is  a bit hard  to accept  this description of 
the steady state, where adjustment costs do not play  a role. 
On  a  more  important  matter,  the  aggregate  supply  sector  of  the 
model-determining  price  behavior-is  unworthy  of  the  name,  since, 
as McCallum  noted,  the  price  level  is  consistent  with  any  aggregate 
quantity supplied, which  is passively determined by  aggregate demand. 
Given money growth, the path of  the price level in this recursive model 
is determined independently of  movements in real income and interest 
rates, which are then solved for in the demand sector of  the model, given 
expected price levels. While the partial  adjustment of  prices  adds real- 
ism to the model, I would have preferred to see it appended to a Lucas- 
type aggregate supply function-distinguishing  between aggregate supply 
and aggregate demand-so  that all the variables could be simultaneously 
determined. I wonder whether  the  dynamic properties  of  the model- 
involving rapid adjustments of  real variables which constitute the paper’s 
main contribution-would  not be significantly altered by such an alter- 
native specification. 
Another  extension of  the model that would  greatly enhance its real- 
ism would be to make the money stock endogenous via a central bank 
reaction  function.  Such behavior  plays  a  crucial  role in current  oper- 
ations  of  financial  markets.  Very  short  term  interest  rates  and  the 
nominal money stock can be usefully viewed as determined by the inter- 
action of  a money demand function and an upward sloping rate setting 
function  of  the  Federal  Reserve,  dependent  on  the  observed  money 
stock and other variables,  as discussed in Shiller’s paper. Thus, as con- 
firmed  by  Blanchard’s  statistical  causality  tests,  reserves  and  high- 
powered  money  are in  fact  endogenous. These variables  are  adjusted 
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demand or the multiplier in order to maintain the desired Federal funds 
rate  (determined by the reaction function). 
Market participants  essentially forecast the future points of  intersec- 
tion  of  the  money  demand  and  Federal  Reserve  reaction  functions, 
which  imply  an expected  future path  of  short-term  rates.  Then,  as is 
implicit in  Blanchard’s  model,  the term structure of  rates used in dis- 
counting expected stock dividends is determined. Unexpected movements 
in  the stock of money  affect market participants’ perceptions of  future 
short-term rates and thus affect longer-term rates and stock prices. 
There is evidence from studies using weekly data that market partici- 
pants  view  the money  demand  function  as being  more unstable than 
the Federal Reserve reaction  function. The portion of  weekly changes 
in the money stock that is unexpected gives rise to immediate movements 
in  one-month  and longer  interest  rates in  the  same direction  and im- 
mediate  movements  in  stock  prices  in  an  opposite  direction.  That is, 
when  announcements of  weekly money  stock changes  are higher  than 
expected  by  the market,  the  market  believes that a future increase in 
the funds rate operating target is then more likely. Hence, all rates tend 
to move up a bit.  Similar  estimates  of  the magnitude of  this  effect in 
the  1970s have been found in studies that use different measures of  the 
weekly  innovation  in  the  money  stock. Each  $1  billion  innovation in 
M1  announced  at  4:lO  P.M. on  Thursday  is  associated,  on  average, 
with a  1 to 3 basis point change of  the same sign in levels of  short and 
long rates from the close on Thursday to the opening on Friday. This 
effect is quite significant statistically. 
This kind of  behavior could be captured in a model like Blanchard’s 
that  incorporated  the  Federal  Reserve’s  reaction  function,  as  well  as 
stochastic  effects. Identification  problems  in  the  estimation  of  such  a 
function, however,  are severe, as Shiller noted. Incidentally, such prob- 
lems  plague  Blanchard’s  estimated money  demand  equation,  as he is 
aware. 
General Discussion 
In responding to comments, Blanchard stated that the main purpose of 
his paper  was  to build  a structural  model that could meet the Lucas 
challenge,  and  be  used  in  policy  simulations.  It became  clear  very 
quickly  that  the  data  are  not  powerful  enough  to distinguish  among 
different aggregate supply specifications. He believed the characteristics 
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Blanchard  said  it was  difficult to find variables that are exogenous 
with respect to aggregate  demand. He thought that the lack  of  instru- 
ments might be a problem  mainly for the demand for money function. 
He added that he did not think the fact that the steady state value of q 
in his model was less than one was of  great significance, since the level 
might well be improperly measured. 
Robert Hall commented that the conference was not really  about ra- 
tional expectations at all, but rather  about market clearing. The Blan- 
chard paper accepts rational expectations and uses it in a clear way but 
is  something  of  a throwback  in  not  specifying the basis  for predeter- 
mined prices.  He did not  see why prices should be predetermined  and 
thought  that contract  theory did not  justify any such assumption. Set- 
ting price  and letting the buyer  determine quantity is not rational.  He 
felt that we are neglecting a key link by merely  assuming sticky wages 
and prices. 
Edmund Phelps responded that the Calvo and Phelps paper  (1977) 
tries to explain rigid wages-in  Phelps’s view, with some success. 
Alan  Blinder  noted  that  there were  nonneutralities  of  money other 
than  those  arising  from  sticky  prices.  For instance,  real  interest  rate 
effects on investment would  allow  monetary  changes to affect output. 
He felt that the Blanchard paper was missing inventories and their ef- 
fects  on  production.  He  also  remarked  that  the  government  budget 
constraint is violated  in the paper. 
Robert Gordon agreed that there was no good theory of  rigid prices. 
He believed that the required theory would build  on the heterogeneity 
of  goods and factors, as well as markets. For instance, there is no time 
to conduct a separate auction for every item in a supermarket; similarly 
it is optimal to keep prices of  airline seats fixed in the short run. He was 
not himself  sure that labor markets deserved the central role they had 
been given. 
Robert  Solow felt there was  a tendency to believe  there  must  be a 
single reason for wage and price inflexibility, whereas there are in fact 
probably ten or eleven. He added that he saw nothing bad in Blaiichard’s 
strategy of  elaborating on the demand side of  his model and assuming 
a slow adjustment process on the supply side. 
In summing up, Blanchard remarked that the aggregate demand side 
of  a  model  had  to be  specified,  whatever  was  done  about  aggregate 
supply. He had tried to incorporate inventories, but so far without much 
empirical success. 115  The Monetary Mechanism in the Light of Rational Expectations 
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